Lithuania
Lithuania's Ministry of National Defence convened a National Coordination Work Group for Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in mid-2025, tasked with producing a national PQC transition plan by Q3 2026, which had not yet been published as of this page's last check.
Lithuania's post-quantum cryptography posture is classified as monitoring, led by Ministry of National Defence (Lithuania).
What's verified
Lithuania's Ministry of National Defence hosted the first meeting of a "National Coordination Work Group for Transition to Post-quantum Cryptography," gathering experts from across 17 sectors and institutions. The Work Group was given a strategic task: to develop a national plan for transition to PQC by the third quarter of 2026. Vice Minister of National Defence Tomas Godliauskas described it as opening "a complex but particularly important mission to assist Lithuania in strategically and smoothly transitioning to quantum-proof solutions... to strengthen national cyber resilience, protect key IS against quantum threats and ensure confidence in state-provided digital services."
This is a real, dated, ministry-convened coordination process, not a rumor or a vendor initiative, but it is the formation of a working group tasked with producing a plan, not the plan itself. As of this page's last check, no published national PQC transition plan, charter document, or interim deliverable from the Work Group had been located. Lithuania is not scored against this site's rubric because there is no primary document yet specific enough to score; it is listed here as a jurisdiction actively in motion rather than one that has published nothing.
Who it applies to
The Work Group spans 17 sectors and institutions, which the Ministry describes only in general terms; the specific list of participating sectors and whether private-sector organizations are directly covered (versus only consulted) is not detailed in the published announcement.
What organizations need to do
- Monitor the Ministry of National Defence's publications directly for the national transition plan, due by the end of Q3 2026 (30 September 2026) per the Work Group's mandate.
- Treat this as an early signal rather than an actionable requirement: no deadline, scope, or inventory obligation has been published yet for any specific organization to act on.
- Expect this page to move to a scored status once the transition plan is published, assuming it names a concrete deadline, scope, and enforcement mechanism.
Enforcement and current status
No enforcement mechanism exists yet. The Work Group's own mandate is to develop "legal, technological, organizational and inter-institutional cooperation instruments" as part of the transition plan, meaning any binding requirement would come from that plan once published, not from the working group's formation itself.
FAQ: Lithuania and PQC
- Does Lithuania have a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) law?
- No binding post-quantum law is recorded here for Lithuania. This page tracks it at the "Monitoring" level and has not yet been scored against the rubric, so treat the primary sources listed below as the full extent of what we verified.
- What is Lithuania's PQC migration deadline?
- None. No migration deadline has been published for Lithuania by any regulator we checked, including Ministry of National Defence (Lithuania).
- Does Lithuania require a Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM)?
- No cryptographic inventory or CBOM requirement is recorded here for Lithuania. This page has not yet been scored against the rubric, so treat the primary sources listed below as the full extent of what we verified.