PQC Security
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Lithuania Gave 17 Sectors a Single Deadline to Produce One National PQC Transition Plan

A Vice Minister of National Defence convened the Work Group himself and named a Q3 2026 delivery date. The plan doesn't exist yet, and which sectors are bound versus merely consulted still isn't public.

PQC Security Editorial3 min read

A government ministry convening a 17-sector working group with a named deadline is a stronger early signal than most countries manage. Lithuania just hasn't reached the point where that signal becomes something an organization can act on yet.

A ministry-led effort with a real deadline attached

Lithuania's Ministry of National Defence hosted the first meeting of a "National Coordination Work Group for Transition to Post-quantum Cryptography," gathering experts from 17 sectors and institutions. This isn't a quiet working-level initiative -- Vice Minister of National Defence Tomas Godliauskas personally framed its mission in public remarks: "a complex but particularly important mission to assist Lithuania in strategically and smoothly transitioning to quantum-proof solutions... to strengthen national cyber resilience, protect key IS against quantum threats and ensure confidence in state-provided digital services."

The Work Group has a specific, dated task: develop a national plan for transition to PQC by the third quarter of 2026 -- 30 September 2026. That's a real deadline, ministry-set, for a real deliverable. Among the countries on this tracker still in an early, pre-publication stage, having a named minister and a specific delivery quarter attached to the effort is a meaningfully stronger starting position than a vague "we are monitoring the situation" statement would be.

What the deadline is actually for

It's worth being precise about what that Q3 2026 date applies to. It's a deadline for the Work Group to produce a plan -- not a migration deadline for any organization operating in Lithuania. Nobody outside the Work Group itself has anything to comply with by that date. The plan, once published, is what would presumably set compliance dates for others; the Work Group's own deadline is upstream of that.

This is why Lithuania isn't scored against this tracker's five-axis rubric: there's no primary document yet specific enough to score mandate strength, deadline concreteness, scope, inventory requirements, or regulatory activity against. What exists is a real, dated, ministry-convened process in motion -- genuinely different from "nothing is happening," but not yet the kind of document the rubric is built to evaluate.

The detail still missing

The Ministry's own announcement names "17 sectors and institutions" in general terms, without listing them specifically, and without clarifying whether private-sector organizations are directly covered by the eventual plan or only consulted in producing it. That's a meaningful gap for any organization trying to figure out whether it will be bound by what comes out of this process -- the honest answer right now is that nobody outside the Work Group knows yet, because the scope hasn't been published.

What to do with this

If you operate in Lithuania, the actionable move is to monitor the Ministry of National Defence's publications directly for the national transition plan, due by 30 September 2026 per the Work Group's own mandate -- that date has already passed as of this review if the plan hasn't yet appeared, which is itself useful information about whether the timeline held. Treat the Work Group's existence as an early signal rather than an actionable requirement: no deadline, scope, or inventory obligation currently binds any specific organization. Expect this page to move to a scored status once the transition plan is published, assuming it names a concrete deadline, scope, and enforcement mechanism, which the Work Group's stated task (producing "legal, technological, organizational and inter-institutional cooperation instruments") suggests it's designed to do.

The Lithuania country page tracks the Work Group's formation against the Ministry of National Defence's own announcement.

Frequently asked questions

Does Lithuania have a national post-quantum cryptography plan?
Not yet. Lithuania's Ministry of National Defence convened a National Coordination Work Group for Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in mid-2025, tasked with producing a national transition plan by Q3 2026 (30 September 2026). As of this review, no published plan, charter document, or interim deliverable from the Work Group has been located.
Who leads Lithuania's PQC Work Group?
The Ministry of National Defence. Vice Minister of National Defence Tomas Godliauskas described convening the group as opening 'a complex but particularly important mission to assist Lithuania in strategically and smoothly transitioning to quantum-proof solutions... to strengthen national cyber resilience, protect key IS against quantum threats and ensure confidence in state-provided digital services.'
How many sectors does Lithuania's Work Group cover?
Experts from 17 sectors and institutions, per the Ministry's own announcement -- but the specific list of participating sectors, and whether private-sector organizations are directly covered versus only consulted, is not detailed in the published announcement.
Is Lithuania scored on this tracker's rubric?
No. Lithuania is listed as a jurisdiction actively in motion rather than scored, because there is no primary document yet specific enough to score against the rubric's five axes. The Work Group's formation is confirmed and dated; its output is not yet published.
What is Lithuania's PQC deadline?
The Work Group itself has a deadline: deliver a national transition plan by the third quarter of 2026 (30 September 2026). That is a deadline for the plan's existence, not a migration deadline for any organization -- no compliance date has been set for anyone outside the Work Group itself.
Will Lithuania's plan be enforceable?
Unknown yet. The Work Group's own mandate is to develop 'legal, technological, organizational and inter-institutional cooperation instruments' as part of the transition plan -- meaning any binding requirement would come from that plan once published, not from the Work Group's formation itself.