ML-KEM
FIPS 203Formerly known as CRYSTALS-Kyber
The key-encapsulation mechanism every jurisdiction in this dataset that names an algorithm at all recommends as the default post-quantum replacement for RSA and ECDH key exchange.
Looking for what ML-KEM actually is? See the glossary entry. This page tracks who requires it, not how it works.
Approved or recommended by
ML-KEM-1024
ML-KEM-1024 required for all classification levels on National Security Systems.
“Use ML-KEM-1024 for all classification levels.”NSA CNSA Suite 2.0 and Quantum Computing FAQ (Dec 2024) →
ML-KEM-512 · ML-KEM-768 · ML-KEM-1024
Instrução Normativa ITI nº 35 (30 Jan 2026), DOC-ICP-01.01 v6.0 →ML-KEM-768 (Category 3) · ML-KEM-1024 (Category 5)
Added to the CRYPTREC Ciphers List for the first time on 30 March 2026, as a brand-new PQC table separate from the long-standing classical e-Government Recommended Ciphers List. Only key-establishment algorithms were added; the signature-algorithm row in the same table is an explicit placeholder, with a footnote stating that adding a PQC signature algorithm "is under consideration." The existing classical list (RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, DH, ECDH) carries no sunset date — this is additive, not a replacement.
CRYPTREC Ciphers List (CRYPTREC LS-0001-2022R2), revised 30 March 2026 →ML-KEM-768 (until 2030) · ML-KEM-1024 (no sunset stated)
ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 are both approved today, but ASD states explicitly that ML-KEM-768 "will not be approved beyond 2030," for interoperability and maintainability reasons — Australia is sunsetting its own weaker approved PQC parameter set on the same 2030 horizon most jurisdictions use only for retiring classical algorithms.
“The use of ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 are approved. However, for interoperability and maintainability reasons, ML-KEM-768 will not be approved beyond 2030.”ASD Information Security Manual, Guidelines for Cryptography (control ISM-1995, updated Dec-24) →
ML-KEM-768
“The NCSC recommends ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 as providing appropriate levels of security and efficiency for most use cases.”NCSC, "Next steps in preparing for post-quantum cryptography" →
level-5 preferred, level-3 acceptable
Hybridation with a classical algorithm required for products seeking a French security visa.
“We recommend to use the highest NIST security level as possible, preferably level-5 (i.e. equivalent to AES-256) or level-3.”ANSSI views on the Post-Quantum Cryptography transition (2023 follow-up) →
ML-KEM-768 · ML-KEM-1024
Recommended only in hybrid combination with a classical algorithm.
“Derzeit wird ausschließlich der hybride Einsatz von quantensicheren Verfahren in Kombination mit klassischen Verfahren empfohlen.”BSI TR-02102-1, Version 2026-01 →
ML-KEM-1024 recommended · ML-KEM-768 acceptable
Recommended in hybrid-AND combination with ECDH.
“The ML-KEM standard specifies security level 3 as the default option; thus, our recommendations can be considered slightly more conservative.”The PQC Migration Handbook, 2nd edition (Dec 2024) →
X25519MLKEM768 · SecP256r1MLKEM768 · SecP384r1MLKEM1024
Only in named hybrid groups; pure ML-KEM not yet in the recommended tier.
“si raccomanda l'utilizzo di schemi ibridi, cioè X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768 e SecP384r1MLKEM1024.”ACN, Linee Guida Funzioni Crittografiche — TLS, v2.0 (12 May 2026) →
ML-KEM-512 · ML-KEM-768 · ML-KEM-1024
ITSP.40.111 →ML-KEM-768 (NIST default per the guide)
“NIST 建議預設使用 ML-KEM-768”後量子密碼遷移指引 v1.00 (16 April 2025) →
“Recommended ... Public-Key Asymmetric Encryption/KEMs: FIPS-203 (CRYSTALS-KYBER)”TEC 910018:2025, Technical Report: Migration to Post Quantum Cryptography (January 2025) →
ML-KEM-512 · ML-KEM-768 · ML-KEM-1024
AKSA MySEAL 2.1 Approved algorithm list →This page lists only jurisdictions we have researched and where a primary source names a position on ML-KEM specifically. Absence from this list is not evidence a country prohibits or ignores it -- see that country's page directly.