PQC Security

ML-KEM

FIPS 203

Formerly known as CRYSTALS-Kyber

The key-encapsulation mechanism every jurisdiction in this dataset that names an algorithm at all recommends as the default post-quantum replacement for RSA and ECDH key exchange.

Looking for what ML-KEM actually is? See the glossary entry. This page tracks who requires it, not how it works.

Approved or recommended by

United StatesNSA (CNSA 2.0)
Mandated

ML-KEM-1024

ML-KEM-1024 required for all classification levels on National Security Systems.

“Use ML-KEM-1024 for all classification levels.”
NSA CNSA Suite 2.0 and Quantum Computing FAQ (Dec 2024) →
BrazilITI (Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia da Informação)
Mandated

ML-KEM-512 · ML-KEM-768 · ML-KEM-1024

Instrução Normativa ITI nº 35 (30 Jan 2026), DOC-ICP-01.01 v6.0 →
JapanCRYPTREC (Digital Agency / MIC / METI)
Mandated

ML-KEM-768 (Category 3) · ML-KEM-1024 (Category 5)

Added to the CRYPTREC Ciphers List for the first time on 30 March 2026, as a brand-new PQC table separate from the long-standing classical e-Government Recommended Ciphers List. Only key-establishment algorithms were added; the signature-algorithm row in the same table is an explicit placeholder, with a footnote stating that adding a PQC signature algorithm "is under consideration." The existing classical list (RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, DH, ECDH) carries no sunset date — this is additive, not a replacement.

CRYPTREC Ciphers List (CRYPTREC LS-0001-2022R2), revised 30 March 2026 →
AustraliaASD (Australian Signals Directorate)
Mandated

ML-KEM-768 (until 2030) · ML-KEM-1024 (no sunset stated)

ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 are both approved today, but ASD states explicitly that ML-KEM-768 "will not be approved beyond 2030," for interoperability and maintainability reasons — Australia is sunsetting its own weaker approved PQC parameter set on the same 2030 horizon most jurisdictions use only for retiring classical algorithms.

“The use of ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 are approved. However, for interoperability and maintainability reasons, ML-KEM-768 will not be approved beyond 2030.”
ASD Information Security Manual, Guidelines for Cryptography (control ISM-1995, updated Dec-24) →
Recommended

ML-KEM-768

“The NCSC recommends ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 as providing appropriate levels of security and efficiency for most use cases.”
NCSC, "Next steps in preparing for post-quantum cryptography" →
FranceANSSI
Recommended

level-5 preferred, level-3 acceptable

Hybridation with a classical algorithm required for products seeking a French security visa.

“We recommend to use the highest NIST security level as possible, preferably level-5 (i.e. equivalent to AES-256) or level-3.”
ANSSI views on the Post-Quantum Cryptography transition (2023 follow-up) →
Recommended

ML-KEM-768 · ML-KEM-1024

Recommended only in hybrid combination with a classical algorithm.

“Derzeit wird ausschließlich der hybride Einsatz von quantensicheren Verfahren in Kombination mit klassischen Verfahren empfohlen.”
BSI TR-02102-1, Version 2026-01 →
NetherlandsAIVD / CWI / TNO
Recommended

ML-KEM-1024 recommended · ML-KEM-768 acceptable

Recommended in hybrid-AND combination with ECDH.

“The ML-KEM standard specifies security level 3 as the default option; thus, our recommendations can be considered slightly more conservative.”
The PQC Migration Handbook, 2nd edition (Dec 2024) →
SpainCCN (Centro Criptológico Nacional)
Recommended
CCN-TEC 009 BP/37 (July 2026) →
Recommended

X25519MLKEM768 · SecP256r1MLKEM768 · SecP384r1MLKEM1024

Only in named hybrid groups; pure ML-KEM not yet in the recommended tier.

“si raccomanda l'utilizzo di schemi ibridi, cioè X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768 e SecP384r1MLKEM1024.”
ACN, Linee Guida Funzioni Crittografiche — TLS, v2.0 (12 May 2026) →
CanadaCanadian Centre for Cyber Security
Recommended

ML-KEM-512 · ML-KEM-768 · ML-KEM-1024

ITSP.40.111 →
TaiwanPQC-CIA / III industry-alliance guide, adopting NIST by reference
Recommended

ML-KEM-768 (NIST default per the guide)

“NIST 建議預設使用 ML-KEM-768”
後量子密碼遷移指引 v1.00 (16 April 2025) →
IndiaTelecommunication Engineering Centre (TEC), Department of Telecommunications
Recommended
“Recommended ... Public-Key Asymmetric Encryption/KEMs: FIPS-203 (CRYSTALS-KYBER)”
TEC 910018:2025, Technical Report: Migration to Post Quantum Cryptography (January 2025) →
MalaysiaCyberSecurity Malaysia (MySEAL)
Permitted

ML-KEM-512 · ML-KEM-768 · ML-KEM-1024

AKSA MySEAL 2.1 Approved algorithm list →

This page lists only jurisdictions we have researched and where a primary source names a position on ML-KEM specifically. Absence from this list is not evidence a country prohibits or ignores it -- see that country's page directly.