PQC Security
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Hong Kong

Hong Kong's HKMA launched a banking-sector Quantum Preparedness Index and whitepaper (July 2026), setting a 2030 target for full sectoral readiness (QPI score of 10) via guidance and engagement rather than binding rules, with no CBOM/inventory mandate specified.

Hong Kong's post-quantum cryptography posture is classified as regulated, led by Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), with a migration target of 2030. It scores 50/100 on this tracker's rubric, a moderately binding rule, with real gaps in scope or enforcement, and that is not a measure of how secure or advanced the country actually is.

What's verified

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) launched the "Whitepaper on Quantum Preparedness of Hong Kong's Banking Sector" together with the first Quantum Preparedness Index (QPI), on 27 July 2026. The initial sector-wide QPI score is 2.3 on a 10-point scale (assessed across four dimensions: Awareness, Planning, Pilots, and Practical Preparedness), reflecting an early stage of preparedness. The HKMA aims to support the banking sector in achieving full sectoral readiness (a QPI score of 10) by 2030 through practical guidance, training, and industry engagement. Thirty-two percent of surveyed banks had not begun. One of the industry's own top-three asks, recorded in the whitepaper, was for "Clear Supervisory Expectations & Timelines" — a request for rules that do not yet exist.

The binding rule still says RSA-2048, and never mentions quantum

Hong Kong's actual mandatory cryptography standard is not the HKMA whitepaper. It is the OGCIO / Digital Policy Office "IT Security Guidelines" [G3], binding on government bureaux and departments, whose current version 10.2 dates from April 2025. It sets the floor in the language of obligation:

"For information classified as CONFIDENTIAL or above, the symmetric encryption key length shall be at least 128-bit for the AES encryption or equivalent. Subject to operational needs, the requirement can also be met by SM4. Whereas the asymmetric encryption key length shall be at least 2048-bit for the RSA encryption. Alternatively, the requirement can be met by Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) encryption with a key length of at least 224-bit or equivalent, as well as SM2 subject to operational needs."

We searched the full document: it contains no occurrence of "quantum" or "post-quantum." RSA-2048 and ECC-224 — precisely the primitives every other jurisdiction on this tracker is planning to retire — remain Hong Kong's binding minimum as of its most recent revision, with no migration provision attached. The guidelines also permit the Chinese national algorithms SM2, SM3, and SM4 as alternatives.

That is the gap worth understanding about Hong Kong. The quantum work is real but advisory and confined to banking; the instrument that actually carries "shall" has not been touched by it.

What the whitepaper does and does not do

The HKMA whitepaper names no approved algorithm and sets no parameter set. ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, XMSS, LMS, and HQC appear in it only in the appendix glossary, as expansions of acronyms, and the document contains no reference to FIPS at all. It specifies no deprecation and no key-size threshold. Its Figure 5 tabulates government PQC migration deadlines for Canada, the United States, Australia, the EU, Singapore, India, the United Kingdom, and Germany — Hong Kong is not a row in its own table. On hybrid deployment it is neutral rather than directive, noting that "hybrid encryption has additional overheads." Its obligations on authorized institutions are consistently phrased "should" or "may."

It does, however, take a real position on cryptographic inventory. The QPI's four dimensions break down into named sub-indices, one of which is "Cryptographic Discovery and Inventory," and one of the whitepaper's top recommendations is to "commission a cryptographic inventory, accepting that it will be imperfect at first and improve with iteration." It names the artifact directly: "a comprehensive cryptographic inventory, sometimes referred to as a CBOM, provides the foundation for assessing exposure, prioritising remediation activities, and tracking transition progress." The baseline is thin — most institutions surveyed still rely on spreadsheets or have no formal discovery process at all — but the recommendation itself is explicit, named, and measured, which is more than several binding instruments elsewhere on this tracker manage.

The clearest statement of the whitepaper's own posture is in its foreword: "the HKMA's approach is to encourage the industry to begin early." That is advisory language from a real supervisor to a defined, supervised sector, not a bystander's commentary — which is why this scores above zero on mandate strength despite carrying no enforcement mechanism.

Score rationale

Each axis is scored 0–20 against the primary sources listed on this page. See the methodology for what each axis measures and how scores are derived.

AxisScoreWhy
Mandate strength
5/20
HKMA's own language is consistently soft: the whitepaper and press release both frame the 2030 target as something HKMA supports banks toward, not a requirement — 'the HKMA's approach is to encourage the industry to begin early.' It was produced under the Fintech Promotion Blueprint, a promotion rather than supervisory instrument, and we found no circular, Supervisory Policy Manual module, or C-RAF component addressing PQC. The whitepaper itself records that 87% of surveyed banks named 'clear supervisory expectations and timelines' as a top-3 unmet need — banks are asking for a mandate because none exists. Scored low but non-zero because HKMA is a real supervisor engaging a defined sector, not an uninvolved bystander.
Deadline concreteness
15/20
2030 is a specific, repeated year, but the modal throughout is 'with the aim of achieving full sectoral readiness by 2030,' an HKMA aspiration for the sector rather than a compliance date binding on any authorized institution. Scored below the maximum because an aim is not a deadline.
Scope of coverage
10/20
The whitepaper and QPI explicitly target Hong Kong's banking sector under HKMA supervision, a single specific regulated sector rather than the whole economy or all critical infrastructure.
Inventory/CBOM requirement
10/20
The whitepaper carries a dedicated 'Cryptographic Discovery and Inventory' sub-index within the QPI and a top-4 recommendation to 'commission a cryptographic inventory, accepting that it will be imperfect at first and improve with iteration,' explicitly naming CBOM: 'a comprehensive cryptographic inventory, sometimes referred to as a CBOM, provides the foundation for assessing exposure.' This is a real, named, advisory inventory recommendation with measured baseline data (most institutions still rely on spreadsheets or no formal process), not the absence the previous score reflected.
Regulatory activity
10/20
HKMA is explicitly named as the issuing authority and runs an annual QPI survey it says it will track, but no enforcement mechanism such as fines, audits, or certification requirements is described anywhere in the whitepaper or press release.
Total50/100A blunt sum of the five columns to its left.

Related regulators

Sector bodies checked independently, not assumed from the primary source above.

  • SFC (Securities and Futures Commission) logo

    SFC (Securities and Futures Commission)

    Not yet addressed, a gap to watch

    SFC's recent cybersecurity circulars address AI-enabled cyberattack resilience and an OTP-to-passkey authentication mandate, but neither addresses PQC or cryptographic inventory.

  • OFCA (Office of the Communications Authority) logo

    OFCA (Office of the Communications Authority)

    Not yet addressed, a gap to watch

    OFCA adopts the Critical Infrastructure Commissioner's general Code of Practice rather than authoring its own cryptographic guidance; that CoP does not mention post-quantum cryptography or CBOM, though OFCA has left the door open to issuing sector-specific codes in future.

FAQ: Hong Kong and PQC

Does Hong Kong have a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) law?
No. Nothing published for Hong Kong carries statutory force for post-quantum cryptography as of this page's last review. What exists is a published instrument whose post-quantum clauses are not themselves mandatory, set out with its primary sources below. The lead body is Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA).
What is Hong Kong's PQC migration deadline?
2030. See the sources below for what this deadline actually covers, since it may apply only to specific sectors or system types. The deadline came from Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA).
Does Hong Kong require a Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM)?
Implicitly. The sources imply organizations will need a cryptographic inventory to comply, without naming CBOM as a formal requirement.