Russia's Post-Quantum Working Group Has Existed Since 2019. It Still Hasn't Named an Algorithm.
TC 26's Working Group 2.5 is real, confirmed directly on its own site, and has been running for six years. No GOST post-quantum standard has cleared formal standardization, and press estimates of a 2026-2027 date aren't sourced to TC 26 itself.
Six years is a long time for a working group to exist without producing a standard. Russia's TC 26 Working Group 2.5 is a real, confirmed, ongoing body -- and it illustrates how much institutional activity can accumulate before a sovereign cryptography track actually produces something organizations can comply with.
A working group older than most countries' entire PQC story
TC 26 -- the Technical Committee for Standardization "Cryptographic Protection of Information," operating under Rosstandart with the FSB as lead regulator -- maintains Russia's GOST cryptographic standard series, the sovereign algorithm track Russia runs independently of RSA/ECC/AES-family standards, much as China runs SM2/SM3/SM4. TC 26's own site confirms, directly and without ambiguity, that it has operated Working Group 2.5, "Постквантовые криптографические механизмы" (Post-Quantum Cryptographic Mechanisms), since 2019 -- alongside a related working group (4.5) on quantum key distribution systems.
2019 predates most of the national PQC activity catalogued elsewhere on this tracker by several years. Most countries' PQC story starts somewhere around NIST's 2022-2024 algorithm finalization; Russia's sovereign working group was already three to five years into its mandate by that point.
What six years of activity has not produced
No adopted GOST post-quantum standard exists. Candidate algorithm names circulate in Russian-language technical press, but none has cleared formal standardization as of this review. TC 26 itself has not published a target date for when that might happen -- informal press estimates putting a standard at 2026-2027 are not sourced to TC 26 directly, and should be read as speculation rather than an institutional commitment.
That gap between "working group has existed for years" and "standard has been published" is worth sitting with. It's a reminder that institutional longevity and regulatory output are different things, and that a six-year-old working group is not, by itself, evidence that a standard is imminent.
What a future standard would probably look like
If and when a GOST post-quantum standard lands, the likely pattern follows how existing GOST cryptographic standards already work: mandatory for Russian government systems and regulated sectors, with banking the clearest candidate, since the Central Bank of Russia's existing cryptographic rules already require GOST-compliant algorithms today. Elsewhere, compliance would likely remain optional, the same dual-track pattern China's SM-series follows -- a sovereign profile for regulated/government use, with international standards remaining available elsewhere.
What's still missing
No standard, no deadline, and therefore no enforcement mechanism specific to post-quantum algorithms. Russia's existing GOST-mandated cryptographic regulations for government and regulated-sector systems carry real enforcement weight independently of this, but nothing in that existing framework yet addresses post-quantum algorithms specifically.
What to do with this
If you operate under Russia's existing GOST cryptographic obligations (GOST R 34.10/34.11 today), the actionable move is to watch TC 26's own publications directly rather than relying on secondary press reporting of expected timelines -- this tracker found no primary-sourced date to plan against. Multinational organizations already navigating Russia's sovereign-algorithm requirements should expect any eventual post-quantum GOST extension to follow the same dual-track pattern as the existing standards: a separate cryptographic profile from NIST-aligned markets, not a drop-in replacement.
The Russia country page tracks TC 26's working-group structure against its own published organizational page.
Frequently asked questions
- Does Russia have a post-quantum cryptography standard?
- No. As of this review, there is no adopted GOST standard for post-quantum algorithms. Candidate algorithm names circulate in Russian-language technical press, but none has cleared formal standardization.
- What is TC 26 and what has it done on post-quantum cryptography?
- TC 26 (Технический комитет по стандартизации 'Криптографическая защита информации') operates under Rosstandart, with the FSB as lead regulator, and maintains Russia's sovereign GOST cryptographic standard series. It has run Working Group 2.5, 'Постквантовые криптографические механизмы' (Post-Quantum Cryptographic Mechanisms), since 2019 -- confirmed directly on TC 26's own site, alongside a related working group on quantum key distribution (WG 4.5).
- When will Russia publish a post-quantum GOST standard?
- No confirmed date exists. Informal press estimates of a 2026-2027 standard are not sourced to TC 26 directly and should be treated as speculative, not as a commitment from the standards body itself.
- Who would a future Russian PQC standard apply to?
- Nobody yet, in a binding sense -- there is no standard to comply with. If a GOST post-quantum standard is adopted, it would likely apply the way existing GOST cryptographic standards do: mandatory for Russian government systems and regulated sectors, notably banking, where the Central Bank of Russia's existing rules already require GOST-compliant algorithms, and optional elsewhere.
- How does Russia's approach compare to China's sovereign PQC track?
- Structurally similar -- both maintain independent national cryptographic standard series (GOST for Russia, SM2/SM3/SM4 for China) separate from NIST-aligned algorithms, and both are now extending that sovereignty model to post-quantum cryptography. China's process (through ICCS) is further along procedurally, having run a formal submission deadline that already passed; Russia's working group has existed longer (since 2019) but has not reached a comparable formal submission stage.